Inside the PureRAT Attack Chain: How a Simple Infostealer Morphs into Full System Domination
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When Huntress Labs began investigating what appeared to be a routine Python-based infostealer campaign, they uncovered a meticulously engineered attack chain culminating in the deployment of PureRAT—a commercially available remote access trojan granting attackers complete system control. This multi-stage intrusion demonstrates how threat actors are increasingly combining custom tooling with off-the-shelf malware to create resilient, modular threats.
The Layered Onion: 10-Stage Attack Progression
Figure 1: Attack chain overview showing progression from phishing to RAT (Source: Huntress Labs)
The operation begins with a phishing email distributing a ZIP archive disguised as a copyright notice. Inside, attackers deploy DLL sideloading—using a legitimate PDF reader to execute malicious version.dll. This triggers a cascade of in-memory payloads:
Stage 1 Loaders:
certutil.exedecodes Base64 blobs hidden inDocument.pdf- A renamed WinRAR binary (
images.png) extracts payloads toC:\Users\Public\Windows - A renamed Python interpreter (
svchost.exe) executes obfuscated scripts
Obfuscation Evolution:
- Payloads use Base85, Base64, RSA/AES/RC4 hybrid encryption, and XOR
- Persistence established via registry run keys mimicking "Windows Update Service"
- Dynamic payload retrieval via Telegram bots and URL shorteners (is[.]gd)
Python Infostealer (Stage 2):
- Harvests Chrome/Firefox credentials, cookies, and credit cards
- Archives data into ZIP files exfiltrated via Telegram API
- Metadata reveals attacker handle
@LoneNone—linked to PXA Stealer operations
The .NET Pivot and PureRAT Payload
Figure 3: Python bytecode loader used in early stages (Source: Huntress Labs)
The campaign pivots dramatically at Stage 3, shifting from Python to .NET binaries:
- Process Hollowing: Legitimate
RegAsm.exehijacked to load malicious .NET assemblies - Defense Evasion: AMSI patching (
AmsiScanBuffer) and ETW unhooking (EtwEventWrite) - Reflective Loading: AES-256 encrypted DLLs (
Mhgljosy.dll) loaded via .NET reflection
After deobfuscating with NETReactorSlayer, researchers uncovered PureRAT’s core:
- TLS-Pinned C2: Communication encrypted with hardcoded X.509 certificate to Vietnamese IP
157.66.26[.]209 - Host Fingerprinting: Exhaustive reconnaissance via WMI queries for:
- Antivirus products
- Cryptocurrency wallets
- Webcam availability
- System privilege levels
- Modular Tasking: Awaiting encrypted plugins for capabilities like:
- Hidden VNC desktop access (PureHVNC)
- Real-time keylogging
- Cryptocurrency address swapping (PureClipper)
Attribution and Implications
Telegram handles (@LoneNone), Vietnamese infrastructure, and payload metadata strongly link this operation to PXA Stealer developers. Their shift from amateurish Python obfuscation to commercial tools like PureRAT signals dangerous maturation:
"The pivot from custom-coded stealers to commercial RATs lowers barriers for attackers, providing stable, feature-rich toolkits without development overhead. This enables persistent surveillance, lateral movement, and financial theft at scale." — Huntress Analysis
Defense-in-Depth: The Only Viable Strategy
No single control could stop this chain. Critical detection points include:
- Phishing Vigilance: Suspicious ZIP/PDF pairings
- Process Monitoring: certutil decoding + WinRAR spawning Python
- Memory Analysis: Unusual .NET reflection and hollowed processes
- Network Signatures: TLS traffic to uncommon ports (56001-56003)
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| IP | 157.66.26[.]209 | PureRAT C2 Server |
| DLL | Mhgljosy.dll (SHA256: e0e72...) | PureRAT payload |
| Reg Key | HKCU\...\Run\Windows Update Service | Persistence mechanism |
The Evolving Commodity Malware Threat
PureRAT exemplifies the professionalization of cybercrime—advertised publicly with features rivaling enterprise software. This incident underscores how attackers blend open-source techniques (process hollowing) with commercial malware (PureCoder’s toolkit) to create adaptable, hard-to-detect threats. Continuous threat intelligence—like Huntress’ Tradecraft Tuesday sessions—remains essential for defenders navigating this landscape.
Source: BleepingComputer