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For decades, the Russian state-sponsored hacking group Turla (also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, or Secret Blizzard) has been synonymous with cyberespionage innovation. From malware communicating via satellite links to hijacking criminal botnets, their tradecraft pushed boundaries. Now, a new report from Microsoft details an audacious, low-tech-high-impact operation on their home turf: leveraging state control over Russia's internet infrastructure to disable encryption on embassy computers.

Blending Hacking with State Surveillance

Microsoft's Threat Intelligence team uncovered Turla using its apparent access to Russian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to manipulate traffic destined for foreign embassies in Moscow. The attack exploited a fundamental browser behavior: the check for "captive portals" (like those in hotels or cafes) that confirm internet access by reaching out to a Microsoft URL.

"This blurs the boundary between passive surveillance and actual intrusion," Sherrod DeGrippo, Microsoft's Director of Threat Intelligence Strategy, told WIRED. "It potentially shows how they think of Russia-based telecom infrastructure as part of their toolkit."

Victims were redirected to a fake error page prompting a "browser certificate update" to regain internet access. Downloading this "update" actually installed Turla's ApolloShadow malware, cunningly disguised as a Kaspersky security product. Once active, ApolloShadow performed a devastatingly simple task: it silently stripped encryption (TLS/SSL) from all web traffic exiting the infected machine.

The Power of Plaintext

This maneuver bypassed the need for complex exploits:
1. No Zero-Days Required: The attack relied on manipulating network paths, not software vulnerabilities. It can't be patched conventionally.
2. Massive Data Exposure: Diplomatic credentials (usernames/passwords), sensitive communications, and browsing activity were transmitted in plaintext, readily harvestable by the ISP and, by extension, Russian intelligence via systems like SORM – Russia's long-standing lawful intercept framework.
3. Stealthy Espionage: Disabling encryption is potentially harder to detect than deploying full-featured spyware, offering persistent access to a firehose of sensitive data.

Implications Beyond Moscow

Turla's ISP-level manipulation represents a significant escalation:
* Domestic Advantage: It demonstrates how state-aligned groups can weaponize national infrastructure for highly targeted espionage within their borders.
* Global Warning: DeGrippo emphasizes this technique is a blueprint others could adopt. "If you're a target of interest traveling or working in countries that have these state-aligned ISPs... you need to concern yourself with this."
* Defensive Shifts: Traditional patching is ineffective. Microsoft recommends:
* Mandatory VPNs: To encrypt traffic end-to-end, bypassing the local ISP's view.
* Satellite Connections: For critical operations, avoiding the local ISP entirely.
* Strict MFA: Mitigating credential theft even if passwords are intercepted.

Turla's latest operation underscores a chilling reality: in regions where the state controls the digital pipes, the very infrastructure enabling connectivity becomes a potent weapon for those with the access to wield it. Defending against this requires fundamentally rethinking trust models for network access in high-risk environments.