European Right‑Wing Populists and China: Four Key Takeaways

Business news

European right‑wing populist parties are gaining electoral ground, but their approaches to China differ sharply. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has begun framing Beijing as a security risk tied to immigration and technology theft. In the United Kingdom, the Reform Party and the far‑right activist Tommy Robinson’s “Unite the Kingdom” rally have highlighted Chinese influence in media and academia, while still courting Chinese business interests. Meanwhile, parties in France, Italy and the Netherlands are wrestling with whether to adopt a hard‑line stance or to preserve trade links that benefit regional economies.

Market context

The EU‑China trade relationship remains substantial: in 2025 bilateral goods trade reached €560 billion, with China accounting for roughly 20 % of EU imports. However, the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at €115 billion last year, prompting calls for a more balanced approach. Right‑wing parties are tapping into three overlapping concerns:

1. Economic competition – AfD leaders argue that Chinese subsidies for electric‑vehicle (EV) manufacturers undercut European auto firms, citing the rapid expansion of Chinese EVs like Leapmotor in German showrooms. They propose stricter anti‑dumping duties, echoing recent EU investigations into Chinese solar panels.
2. Immigration and security – Populists link Chinese investment in critical infrastructure—such as 5G networks and ports—to potential espionage, echoing the Norwegian spy case that exposed vulnerabilities in the Arctic supply chain. This narrative resonates with voters worried about “foreign control” of national assets.
3. Sovereignty and cultural influence – Parties in the UK and France have raised alarms over Chinese funding of think‑tanks and university programs, framing them as soft‑power tools that dilute national identity.
4. Geopolitical alignment – Some factions, notably Italy’s League, view China as a counterweight to U.S. pressure, advocating for a pragmatic partnership that safeguards energy supplies and technology transfer.

These positions are reflected in recent parliamentary votes: the German Bundestag approved a €2 billion fund for “strategic autonomy” in key sectors, a move championed by AfD members who warned against “dependency on Beijing”. In the UK, the Reform Party’s draft policy calls for a 30 % increase in tariffs on Chinese steel, citing unfair subsidies.

What it means

The divergent stances create a fragmented policy environment within the EU. If right‑wing parties enter governing coalitions, we can expect:

• Targeted trade measures: Expect more sector‑specific anti‑dumping investigations, especially in EVs, renewable‑energy equipment, and high‑tech components. Companies like Samsung SDI and Volkswagen may face heightened scrutiny, potentially reshaping supply chains.
• Increased regulatory oversight of Chinese investment: The European Commission’s screening mechanism could be expanded, with tighter thresholds for foreign direct investment in critical infrastructure.
• Potential friction with Washington: While the U.S. continues to push a coordinated “China‑centric” strategy, European populists may prioritize national interests over transatlantic alignment, risking a split in the broader Western front.
• Market volatility for Chinese exporters: A hardening stance could depress demand for Chinese-made EVs and telecom equipment in Europe, prompting Chinese firms to accelerate localization efforts or seek alternative markets.

Overall, the rise of right‑wing populists adds a new layer of uncertainty to EU‑China relations. Their blend of economic protectionism, security concerns, and nationalist rhetoric could push Europe toward a more assertive, albeit uneven, posture toward Beijing.

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Data sources: Eurostat trade statistics 2025, European Commission anti‑dumping reports 2024‑2025, Bundestag budget documents, UK Parliament draft policy (2026).