NASA watchdog report highlights risks in Artemis lunar lander program

The NASA Office of Inspector General has published a report on the agency's management of the lunar Human Landing System (HLS) contracts, highlighting the risks and arguments behind the scenes.

The report commends NASA's handling of the contracts, which were awarded to Blue Origin and SpaceX for vehicles Artemis astronauts will use to reach the lunar surface. However, it also notes the risks accepted in the endeavor and points out the challenges posed by Starship's height.

Where the Apollo lunar module was 23 feet tall, SpaceX's Starship stands at 171 feet, "about the equivalent of a 14-story-tall commercial building," according to the report. On the Apollo 15 mission, the lander settled at an approximate 11° tilt. For Artemis, NASA has said the tilt must not exceed 8°, although navigating the terrain of the lunar South Pole will present a challenge.

"There is a risk," the report noted, "that [Starship's] momentum will continue after landing, causing it to tip over."

Then there is the issue of the crew compartment, which is approximately 115 feet off the ground and requires an elevator to get to and from the surface. If the elevator fails, there is no other way for the crew to get back into the vehicle.

At 53 feet tall, Blue Origin's Blue Moon lander is also taller than the Apollo vehicle, but unlike SpaceX, the crew compartment is considerably closer to the ground, allowing a ladder/stair arrangement.

For piloting the spacecraft, NASA's requirements call for the crew to be able to take manual control of the vehicle during all phases of flight. SpaceX's focus on automation, according to the report, might result in the company requesting a waiver of the manual control requirement to meet the schedule.

Such a waiver is not unheard of. SpaceX was granted a similar one under the Commercial Crew Program, but that was based on considerable experience with the Dragon freighter. Starship has yet to reach orbit, let alone venture anywhere near the lunar surface.

As for Blue Moon, "key decisions on Blue Origin's manual control design have yet to be made."

The report also highlighted NASA's departure from "Test Like You Fly" principles. At first glance, the requirement for uncrewed demonstrations of both the Starship-based HLS and Blue Origin's lander is a good way of ensuring the hardware performs as expected. However, the demonstration won't require life support systems to work, and won't check out the airlock, for example.

Although NASA later added a requirement that demonstration landers be able to ascend from the lunar surface, it did not require docking with Orion or the Gateway in lunar orbit. Indeed, SpaceX does not even plan to reach orbit, let alone demonstrate the elevator, which is deemed a "top risk" by the HLS program.

So, while successfully landing on the Moon will be an impressive technological feat, the demonstrations will not reduce the risk of subsequent missions as much as planners would like since the versions designed for humans will deviate significantly.

NASA agreed with the report's recommendations, including those around manual piloting (consult with the Commercial Crew Program) and crew survival analyses (include strategies for extended crew survival).

An addendum noted that the report did not cover the recent NASA announcement of in-space testing of the vehicles in Low Earth Orbit as part of a revised Artemis III mission in 2027.

The Artemis program represents NASA's ambitious plan to return humans to the Moon, with the ultimate goal of establishing a sustainable presence and using the Moon as a stepping stone for future Mars missions. The Human Landing System contracts are critical components of this program, as they will provide the vehicles that transport astronauts from lunar orbit to the surface and back.

SpaceX's Starship HLS and Blue Origin's Blue Moon represent two very different approaches to lunar landing. Starship's massive size offers advantages in payload capacity and potential for reusability, but also introduces significant engineering challenges, particularly around landing stability and crew egress. The 115-foot elevator requirement is unprecedented in human spaceflight and represents a single point of failure that could strand astronauts on the lunar surface.

Blue Origin's approach with Blue Moon is more conservative in scale but still represents a significant departure from the Apollo-era lunar modules. The company's focus on manual control systems aligns with NASA's traditional safety requirements, though the report indicates that final design decisions on this aspect are still pending.

The departure from "Test Like You Fly" principles is particularly concerning from a safety perspective. The uncrewed demonstration missions, while valuable, will not test critical systems like life support, airlocks, or the Starship elevator. This means that many of the most complex and failure-prone systems will not be validated before human missions.

NASA's decision to accept these risks reflects the agency's aggressive timeline for returning humans to the Moon. The Artemis program faces significant pressure to demonstrate progress and maintain political support, which may be influencing risk tolerance decisions.

The report's recommendations, which NASA has agreed to implement, focus on addressing the most critical safety concerns. Consulting with the Commercial Crew Program on manual piloting requirements could provide valuable lessons from SpaceX's experience with Dragon, though the lunar landing environment presents unique challenges compared to Earth orbit operations.

Crew survival analyses that include extended survival strategies are essential given the potential for system failures during the critical landing and surface operations phases. The lunar environment offers no margin for error, and systems must be designed to keep crews alive even when primary functions fail.

The upcoming in-space testing in Low Earth Orbit represents an opportunity to validate some aspects of the landing systems before lunar missions. However, the LEO environment cannot fully replicate the challenges of lunar descent, landing, and surface operations.

As the Artemis program moves forward, the tension between aggressive timelines and safety requirements will likely continue to generate debate. The Office of Inspector General's report serves as an important check on these decisions, ensuring that risks are properly identified and mitigated rather than simply accepted in pursuit of schedule goals.

The success of Artemis will depend not just on reaching the Moon, but on doing so safely and sustainably. The challenges identified in this report must be addressed to ensure that the program achieves its historic goals without compromising crew safety.